This paper explores the theoretical and policy implications of contemporary American hegemony. A key argument of the paper is that the development of American hegemony generally, and the distinctive turn in American foreign policy that has occurred in the wake of September 11 in particular, can best be understood by placing recent events in a comparative and historical framework. The immediate post-World War II order laid the foundation of a highly institutionalised multilateral system that provided key benefits for a number of countries whilst simultaneously constraining and enhancing American power. An historical reading of American hegemony suggests that its recent unilateralism is undermining the foundations of its power and influence.
Introduction
It is commonplace to describe the position of the United States in the contemporary international system as 'hegemonic', but does hegemony remain a useful concept in political science in the 21 st century? When even The Economist routinely uses the term, it is clearly no longer an expression solely associated with scholarship, but one that seems to capture something fundamental about the nature of the early 21 st century international order. And yet the current 'hegemony of hegemony' conceals as much as it reveals: the analytical purchase that the notion of hegemony once had is in danger of being dissipated through indiscriminate overuse, in much the same way that 'globalisation' also become an over-used and under-specified cliché and hence not always a useful concept. Confusion and imprecision emanates from the fact that hegemony is not static and US hegemony has evolved overtime since the Second World War. It is thus the first aim of this essay to demonstrate that the development of American hegemony generally, and the distinctive turn in American foreign policy that has occurred in the wake of September 11 in particular, can best be understood by placing the more recent events in a comparative and historical framework.
While the current order, considered in the final section of the paper and characterised by unilateralism, is different to the earlier era, it is not as different as a close reading of the history of post World War Two US foreign policy reveals. There are, as we shall demonstrate, also key strands of continuity between the two eras. Specifically, the key distinction is not between multilateralism and unilateralism rather it is between unilateralism and institutionalism. To make such an assertion is not, however, to suggest that the recent manner in which the US has tried to use its unparalleled power to secure compliance with an agenda that primarily reflects its priorities and interests-especially by its linkage of economic and strategic issues-is not unprecedented in the post-World War II period.
Moreover, as we argue by way of conclusion, it is not impossible that the privileging of unilateralism over institutionalism may ultimately weaken the basis of the US hegemonic position. As events in Iraq demonstrate, and as the rise of antiAmericanism around the world suggests more generally, there are limits to American power. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the historical record suggests that the U.S. is most powerful and able to pursue its narrowly conceived national interests when it is most engaged with, and responsive to, the institutional architecture of the international system of which it is such an integral part (Nye 2002; Beeson and Berger 2003) . One of the more important conclusions to emerge from the historically grounded comparative analysis that follows, therefore, is about the nature of hegemony itself. Absent the constraining influence of a rival power with the desire and the apparent capacity to challenge American hegemony, and given the frequently uncritical support of key allies like Britain and Australia, hegemony may generate what, in the domain of international finance, economists call, a situation of 'moral hazard'. Moral hazard sees investors fund risky or unwise enterprises secure in the knowledge that should things go wrong it will be some other actor (host government or local investors) not they, that will carry the cost. In the foreign policy version of moral hazard the hegemon is encouraged to undertake risky foreign policy initiatives in which, as with unsuccessful financial speculation, the principal speculator does not carry the major costs of failure and which, we shall argue by way of conclusion, may also undermine the longer-term primacy of the hegemonic power.
Recasting hegemony
Before considering the ways the idea of hegemony has been used to describe the most dominant power of any era, it is worth saying something about our preference for this term, rather than the increasingly fashionable idea of 'empire' (Hardt and Negri 2000; Cox 2003 ). At the most general level there is still much merit in Adam Watson's (1992: 15-16 ) distinction between empire as the 'direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre', and hegemony as the ability of some power or authority in a system to 'lay down the law' about external relations between states in the international system, while leaving them domestically independent. Although, there is clearly a debate to be had about the precise mechanisms though which such a broad distinction may be realised, and about the amount of independence that such a system might actually confer on various smaller powers, this sort of differentiation still has merit. Even if the recent attempt by the administration of George W. Bush to articulate and justify a 'doctrine of preemption' (US Government, 2002) and its concomitant attempt to occupy and control
Iraq is seen as an imperial impulse, it may prove to be an historical anomaly and one that may ultimately make similar future adventures less, rather than more likely.
Indeed, the long-term consequence of the Iraq conflict may be a reversion to former patterns of less direct hegemonic control.
The concept of hegemony has been employed in a number of different ways, but is always about the pre-eminent position of one power in and over the international system. Charles Kindleberger, who did more than anyone else to popularise the concept in the USA, is generally associated with a neo-realist position that culminated in the hegemonic stability theory so influential for much of the 1970s and 1980s.
Central to Kindleberger's (1973) analysis was the idea that the hegemonic power of the era could -indeed should, in America's case -play a stabilising role in the international system (especially in the field of international finance) by providing collective goods and preventing the sort of economic cataclysm that occurred between the two world wars. Such assumptions about the necessity and potentially benign impact of hegemony provided the background for the elaboration of 'hegemonic stability theory', which claimed that 'hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed' (Keohane 1980: 132) .
The prominent position of hegemonic stability theory was largely undermined by the apparent decline of American power -something that led to a new concern about international stability 'after hegemony' (Keohane 1984 ) -and by the U.S.'s willingness to utilise its power in pursuit of primarily national goals rather than collective goods. As is understood, expectations about American decline can be seriously premature (see, for example, Kennedy, 1987) . Moreover, if the theoretical claims of hegemonic stability theory ever were valid they ought to be vindicated now, when American power is widely considered unipolar (Mastanduno 1997 , Ikenberry, 2002 . In such circumstances, hegemonic unipolarity might be expected to provide the potentially critical prerequisite for stability in a world of anarchy and relative gains (see Hobson 2000) . Recent events, we will argue, have done little to confirm this expectation.
The U.S.'s attempts to act unilaterally where key policymakers judge this to be in American interests suggest that while the current hegemon may enjoy historically unparalleled material advantages, the precise purposes to which such power may be put depends not on the unchanging structure of the international system, but on a complex interaction between domestic forces and shifting, contingent geo-political conditions. Crucial factors here, of course, are the foreign policymaking elites of particular eras. Some of the key figures in the post-war and post-9/11 periods will be considered in greater detail later, but it is worth emphasising at the outset that 'One way of looking at American nationalism, and America's troubled relationship with the contemporary world is to understand that many Americans are in revolt against the world which America has made. … American nationalism is beginning to conflict with any enlightened or even rational version of American imperialism; that is to say, with the interests of the US as world hegemon.' (Leiven, 2004a: 30)
The point we are making here is that the roots of contemporary American foreign policy are national. Indeed, policy has always been mediated by American domestic interests and priorities, rather than simply reflecting the logic of the international system itself. In other words, as Ruggie famously observed about the U.S.'s emerging dominance, 'it was the fact of an American hegemony that was decisive after World War II, not merely American hegemony (Ruggie 1993: 593 [emphasis in original] Mead (2004) has recently described as 'sticky power.
As we shall see, and despite the argument of critics who claim the post-war order that the U.S. effectively created was designed primarily to further the interests of American capital (Kolko, J&G 1972) , the post-war order was widely accepted as functionally necessary and ideologically legitimate.
Capturing this interplay of ideational, institutional and material forces that has effectively constituted American hegemony over the last fifty years or so is a plainly a complex task, but the influential model that draws its theoretical inspiration from
Antonio Gramsci offers at least part of a potential answer. This approach is by now widely enough known to need little recapitulation here (see Germain and Kenny 1998 ), but it is worth briefly highlighting some of its key features and potential advantages. One of the most useful aspects of the schema set out-now more than two decades ago by Robert Cox (1981) -was the attempt to link ideas, material capabilities and institutions, the interaction of which provides the basic structure of a given international order.
This formulation produced a dynamic model of the international system, capable of capturing the evolving nature of hegemony, rather than the more static, state-centric conception, found in (neo) realist scholarship. The key advantage of this approach was that it helped to explain both the basis of American hegemony, its changing nature, and by implication, possible sources of decline. For as Cox (1987: 150) pointed out, one of the most important sources of ideational domination in the liberal market order American hegemony helped create and legitimise, was the separation of economics and politics; the rule-governed economic international order achieved an apparent independence that effectively insulated and entrenched the U.S's overall position as the lynchpin of the system created in the early phase of American hegemony.
This separation of economics and politics is complex, multifaceted and important to our story. It gradually developed throughout the 20 th century at both the level of scholarship (see Caporaso and Levine, 1992) But, what the marginalist revolution in economics had rent asunder at the end of the 19 th century, globalisation, at least in terms of policy, has brought together at the end of the 20 th (for a discussion see Higgott, 1999 and . It is in the context of globalisation-defined here simply as a process of enhanced global economic integration via the progressive liberalisation of trade, deregulation of finance and privatisation of assets and hollowing out of state activities-that this distinction in both a scholarly and a policy sense is undermined. It is in this context that the unilateral application of American power and the re-securitisation of U.S. economic foreign policy is to be understood. To see why American hegemony may ultimately be undermined by its own recent actions, it is useful to contrast post 9/11 policies with the immediate post-war period, when a particular confluence of geo-political circumstances entrenched American dominance at the centre of the emerging international order.
Present at the Creation: The Consolidation of American Power
The parallels between the international system in the respective aftermaths of World War II and September 11 are striking indeed. The U.S. again finds itself engaged in a major reconstruction project involving massive sums of, mainly American, money in a fashion that is routinely compared to the Marshall Plan that began in 1947 (Dalton 2003) . Similarly, the current Bush administration has described itself as being in a 'war on terror' that is eerily reminiscent of the struggle with communism that defined the earlier era. Yet while there are noteworthy parallels between the two periods, there are also important differences -differences which suggest that, despite the overwhelmingly dominant position of the U.S. in both periods, specific foreign policy initiatives, when combined with the dynamic interaction of material and institutional forces more generally, can produce distinctive outcomes that structurally-based readings of American power alone cannot easily account for.
While World War II may have enhanced and revealed the extent of its primacy, the sheer fact of American dominance did not dictate policy. One of the most important influences on the thinking and actions of the policymakers who shaped the immediate post-war order-and something which is notably absent from the present generation-was a 'preoccupation with the past' (Gaddis 1972: 31) . This is hardly surprising. Not only had the world emerged from the most destructive conflict ever seen, but the war itself had been preceded by an unprecedented economic crisis that had thrown millions out of work and into poverty, fuelled the rise of fascism, and raised major questions about the future of capitalism itself. Against such a backdrop, a desire to learn from history and avoid the mistakes of the past was understandable.
What is more surprising is the precise form the American-led response to these earlier traumas took. Significantly, and again in distinction to the present situation, broadly conceived economic initiatives were largely separate from strategic concerns. This distinction should not be drawn too sharply because the successful economic reconstruction of Europe was plainly capable of serving a more encompassing geopolitical goal in the rapidly escalating struggle with communism. 2 But not only is it possible to discern quite distinct influences and rationales for the strategic and economic components of America's emerging post-war policy, there are also important internal influences on policy which meant that the very conception of national security was shaped by domestic forces and experiences (Smith 1994) . It is possible to read unprecedented initiatives like the Marshall Plan as flowing directly out of America's own experiments in economic stimulation under the New Deal (Hogan 1987) . Indeed, it is important to remember that the New Deal itself was 'the first wholly secular reform movement in American history ' (McDougall 1997: 149) , and emblematic of the extensive internal transformation that the long twentieth century was working on the U.S. itself. Significantly, America's post-war planners 'sought to project these principles onto the world as a macrocosm of the New Deal regulatory state (Burley 1993: 125) . In other words, without a major internal reorientation of American attitudes about the possible role of government and appropriate responses to wider geopolitical events, a very different form of hegemony might have developed.
As it was, the defining influence on post-war policy was, of course, the Cold War and the rapidly evolving, Manichean struggle with the Soviet Union. Here the parallels with current 'war on terror' are irresistible, especially given the sense of moral certitude that has pervaded both periods of American policy-making. And yet George Kennan's (1997 Kennan's ( [1947 ) highly influential analysis of Soviet behaviour dealt with a potentially formidable opponent with a similarly global reach; contemporary events by contrast-less than a year past the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and despite some of the inflated rhetoric-are well understood to be of plainly of a different order of magnitude. Not only were American planners in the post-war period constrained by a credible rival, they were also inhibited by what -until recently, at least -had been a pronounced sense of anti-imperialism (Gaddis 1997: 38; Smith 1994: 143) , and a notable caution about 'open-ended' foreign entanglements.
Realists might claim that American responses to the emerging bi-polar order were a product of the structure of that order itself and the U.S.'s pivotal role within it, but the precise nature of American policy is still somewhat surprising. Certainly, the Truman doctrine's uncompromising commitment to support 'free people' may have reflected Kennan's hard-headed, realist analysis of the Soviet threat, but there was also a recognition of the need for widespread aid to support European reconstruction 'for the more urgent purpose of alleviating social and economic conditions which might breed communism' (Gaddis 1972: 317) . Belatedly, a recognition of the complex causes of security threats is now becoming part of the 'war on terror', but it is important to recognise that, in the aftermath of World War II, American policy was part of a more broadly-based effort to create an inter-locking, multilateral institutional structure with which to facilitate not just European re-construction, but also the international integration of economic and political activity more generally. True, America may have been the prime mover in the emerging order and arguably its principal beneficiary, but as Ikenberry (2001) notes, it was an order that not only offered payoffs for allies, but one that provided potentially important, institutionalised constraints on the U.S. and the unilateral application of its power.
The story of the development of the key institutions that emerged in the post-war period has been told elsewhere and is well-enough known to need little recapitulation here. 3 One point, however, is worth emphasising. The scope of US ambition for the institutional architecture, that it did so much to create, should not be underestimated.
In fact our preferred way of describing US policy during the Cold War era is as primarily 'institutionalist' rather than 'multilateralist'. While it took the lead in building multilateral institutions, including alliance structures such as NATO as well as the Bretton Woods economic institutions, the injunction to behave multilaterally always applied more to the junior partners in these organisations than the hegemon itself. Indeed, a hallmark of US hegemony in this period was the development of institutions binding on others, but in which the hegemon was effectively only ever 'self-binding' (Martin, 2003 (Ikenberry, 1993) allowed the creation of a set of collective goods providing institutions acceptable to both the US and its Cold War allies.
As we will suggest, this bargain has come undone since the end of the Cold War as
American administrations have progressively sought to free themselves from these institutionalised constraints and, in the process seemingly weakened the foundations of the post-war international order that American power helped create, and which largely reflected American goals and interests. Indeed, the persuasive arguments of the likes of Ikenberry notwithstanding, even an apparently selfless and multilaterallybased initiative like the Marshall Plan was always tightly controlled by the US, furthered American grand strategy, and was essentially 'unilateralism in the clothing of multilateralism' (Kunz 1997: 33) . 4 The implication of this experience, and one that seems to have largely escaped the current generation of policymakers in the U.S., is that hegemonic power can be effectively-perhaps more effectively-exercised through multilateral auspices.
The impact of American policy in the post-war period is that it had differential impacts that reflected the complex interplay of the contingent, the institutional and the ideational. As Maier (1981) pointed out, America's successful intervention in postwar Europe was made possible by a fundamental transformation in domestic class attitudes across much of the continent: European social structures were consequently more accommodating of American intrusion and receptive to the perceived necessity of national reconstruction. In addition, the fact that Americans were facilitating a process of re-construction, rather than attempting to impose an alien economic order obviously helps account for the success of the European experience; perhaps even more so that of Japan (Tabb 1995) . But American attitudes toward Asia also remind us that the impact of American hegemony was not a universal reflection of its structurally embedded position, but one that reflected contingent historical and cultural attitudes. As Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 575) point out, the distinctive bilateral security architecture that emerged in East Asia reflected American attitudes that saw potential Asian allies as 'part of an alien, and in important ways, inferior community'. Europeans, by contrast, were seen as potential equals -something that was reflected in the multilateral basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
But if American power had differential regional impacts in the aftermath of World
War II, this should not blind us to the further ambition of the institutional architecture it helped create. One of the most important differences between this earlier period and the present is the relationship between the economic and strategic arms of American foreign policy. As we shall see, the current administration is self-consciously linking these elements to achieve short-term policy objectives. In the earlier period, by contrast, and despite the encompassing brief of the Bretton Woods institutions, 5 which were designed to encourage and manage international economic integration, a degree of national policy-making autonomy was built into the system (Ruggie 1982) . Indeed, American policymakers were willing to tolerate different forms of economic organisation and political practices at a time when the central geopolitical preoccupation was the larger struggle with the Soviet Union (Berger 2003).
In retrospect, therefore, American hegemony in the immediate post-war period is characterised by some significant continuities with, and differences from, the contemporary era. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was clearly a major material constraint on American freedom of action, but one which -somewhat fortuitously -provided the legitimating domestic rationale for an expansionary fiscal policy both at home and abroad (Kunz 1997: 331 Europe, but to the latter's long-term political stability and integration (Hogan 1987: 438).
America's European involvement may have been 'by invitation' (Lundstead 1986), and actually encouraged by the Europeans in a way that is sharply at odds with the situation in Iraq, but this only serves to highlight the importance-and unpredictability-of the interplay between contingent geopolitics, ideas and institutions. It was America's ability to create an institutionalised, multilateral order to underpin its emerging hegemonic position that gave it a critical degree of legitimacy, and which enhanced the durability of the overall order of which it was a part. By contrast, at a moment when all agree American power is historically unrivalled, Hegemony, as we have defined it, is looking increasingly brittle. When seen in the light of this earlier experience, the reasons for the surprisingly fragile and paradoxical nature of American power in the contemporary period become more apparent.
The Securitisation of American Foreign Policy
Global terror demands a global solution…America and our friends must move decisively to take advantage of these new opportunities. This is, World War II offered to refashion the world'. 6 Significantly, however, the current Bush administration's attempts to refashion the international order would be in line with a blueprint that significantly pre-dated the events of 9/11. The new vision for the post-S11 order had, in fact, been outlined while Bush was still on the campaign trail.
As Daalder and Lindsay (2003: 13) note, 'What September 11 provided was the rationale and the opportunity to carry out his revolution'. While some of the rhetoric of the proposed new order may have been replete with the familiar staples of
American foreign policy -a commitment to liberty and the promotion of democracythe substance is radically different from earlier periods and predicated on a unilateral application of American power, a self-conscious linking of formerly discrete strategic and economic issues, and the general securitisation of foreign policy.
Foreign economic policy under Bush has come to be articulated in the language of security. Consequently, the distinction between high politics and low politics is disappearing. The audience for this re-articulation, namely the USA's international economic partners, is made aware of the salience of the now inseparable relationship between two domains of policy that were discursively, if not always practically, discrete for much of the 20 th century. There is an accompanying expectation that allies respond accordingly. The aim of securitisation is thus to justify the imposition of conditions and measures in the area of foreign economic policy that would not be considered the norm in this policy domain. 7 Economic globalisation is now seen not simply in neo-liberal economic terms, but also through the lenses of the national security agenda of the United States. Consequently, economic globalisation is seen not only as a benefit, but also as a 'security problem'.
The events of 9/11 offered the opportunity for a group of what some call 'unilateralist-idealists ' (Hassner and Vaisse, 2003) , some call the 'new sovereigntists (Spiro, 2000) , some call the 'new exceptionalists (Hoffmann, 2003) This move is historically unprecedented and theoretically challenging. In essence, both the scholarly literature and the empirical historical evidence suggest that multipolarity creates incentives for economic integration and cooperation between allies as well as enhancing economic interaction as a major instrument of cooperative statecraft. By contrast, as we have suggested, the sort of bi-polarity that prevailed during the Cold War era encouraged the separation of economics and politics. The analysis of uni-polarity is less well defined. While resisting the structural realist assumptions about the independence of state power as an analytical variable in international relations, the experience of the early 21 st century seems to confirm Michael Mastanduno's (1998: 827) argument that a uni-polar structure will see the hegemonic state organise economic policy and practice ' … to line up behind and reinforce its national security strategy'.
In short, there would appear to be a correlation between the degree of dominance of the international system by the US in military terms, and the manner in which it uses economic policy as an arm of security policy. An empirical reading of US policy in the contemporary era shows how a uni-polar moment-in the domains of both trade and finance and at both multilateral and bilateral levels of policy-making, has tempted the hegemon to integrate economic and security policy more closely than under conditions of multi-polarity. It has done so in a manner in which economic policy has become an arm of security policy. US Economic policy-the details of which cannot be discussed here (but see Higgott, 2004a and )-rather than being a mere instrument of economic relations and statecraft has become a part of the armoury of influence that the US uses to develop a strategy towards potential challengers
When seen as part of a wider context, contemporary US policy, especially the doctrine of pre-emption, challenges the bedrock theoretical assumptions (as opposed to historical and practical applications) of sovereignty as we have known them for much of the post-Westphalian era-sovereignty as the centre of authority, the origin of law and the source of individual and collective security within designated boundaries that distinguished the domesticated interior from the anarchical exterior.
As is now well known, the essence of the doctrine of pre-emption was outlined in the National Security Strategy (US Government 2002: 15), which declared that the U.S.
reserved the right to act pre-emptively to 'forestall or prevent attacks by our enemies'
.
Given the open-ended nature of such threats and President Bush's (2002) claim that America has a moral duty to 'take the battle to the enemy', the implications for the sovereign independence of those states the U.S. associates with terrorist activities is profound.
This is not to suggest that sovereignty has previously been an absolute, manageable and uncontested concept, or that sovereignty could ever be equated with an equal form of independence for all states in anything other than the most narrow of legal interpretations (Jackson 1990; Beeson 2003a (Krasner, 1999 ; but see also Walker, 1993 and Spruyt, 1994 ) that gave us some rules around which to organise the development of inter-state relations and create a system of norms, principles, rules and institutions above and beyond, or 'outside' the state.
The point to emphasise here is that at the outset of his administration, the more radical post-sovereign liberal order envisaged by the Bush Administration was to be under written by American military power, and not by the collective approval of a wider liberal community. As the National Security Strategy made clear, '[w] hile the United
States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we
will not hesitate to act alone…' (US Government 2002: 6). As Rhodes (2003: 136) notes, 'America's sovereign responsibilities supersede its commitment to international institutions'. This is of course not a new assertion. While the US has a history of pragmatic involvement in the development of specific international institutions, there has always been a sub-conscious ambivalence in the US attitudes towards multilateralism across the historical period under review in this paper.
In making this assertion, we must be clear what we mean by multilateralism. In the theoretical literature, multilateralism, relates to the management of trans-national problems with three or more parties but operating with a series of acceptable ' … generalized principles of conduct' (Ruggie, 1993: 11) . That is, the principles of behaviour should take precedence over interests. But we need to distinguish between multilaterlism as a principled institutional form of behaviour in international relations (Ruggie, 1993: 8) on the one hand and the actual development and operation of formal international organisations, as the centre-piece of multilateralism as policy practice, on the other.
Overtime, the precedence of principle over interest should lead to collective trust within an institution, amongst players of many different strengths and sizes. A key element in the development of this sense of trust would be a feeling amongst the smaller players that the major actors, especially an erstwhile hegemon, would be willing to accept Martin's principle of 'self-binding'. As we have tried to suggest, the comparative historical narrative of the role of the US in the second half of the 20 th century, and especially in the development of the Bretton Woods institutions, demonstrated a US willingness to be 'self-bound' in a way that is not apparent in the contemporary era. 8 But the distinction between multilatreralism as a principled form of behaviour and multilateralism as the conduct of foreign policy through international institutions is often confused in practice. For many observers of US foreign policy, the use of multilateral institutions is believed to be but one policy option among many, rather than driven by any sense of obligation to operate in this manner. US policy had always been either 'instrumental multilateralism' (Foot et al, 2003) or 'ambivalent engagement' (Stewart and Forman, 2002) driven by an understanding of US 'exceptionalism' (Luck, 2003) .
It is in this context that the language of the unilateralist that has prevailed in the early 21 st century must be located. Multilateralism, be it what we might call the practical realist multilateralism of a Henry Kissinger (2001) or the principled idealist multilateralism of a Joseph Nye (2002), is seen by its opponents as a check on American interests and action. To understand why, we must appreciate not only the ideological objections reflecting the resistance to global cooperation inherent in the increasingly nationalist underpinnings of US foreign policy identified earlier in the work of Leiven (2004a and b) . We must also note that a key element in the contemporary theory and practice of global governance-the evolution of global networks at the expense of international hierarchies-is not welcomed in Washington.
Networks pursue their activities (such as waging unconventional war on states) by using systems of sprawling, horizontally interconnected, networks of private power and authority (Rosenau, 2002, Hall and Biersteker, 2002 .) Notwithstanding US military and economic preponderance, the changing structures of authority-or more Multilateralism for large sections of the US policy community, at best, implies the opportunity for others to free ride on the US's material support. At worst, it implies sovereignty dilution and unwanted entanglements. This is not simply to argue that the US has repudiated multilateralism as a principled institutional form of governance in its entirety. Rather, the US has become more instrumental in its choice of issue areas in which it will adopt a multilateral approach as a matter of preferred policy practice.
It has adopted a 'pick and mix' approach. As can be seen from its efforts to establish a post-Saddam order in Iraq it will accept 'legitimating' and burden sharing multilateral engagements provided they suit its preferred policy positions and do not constrain its ability for manoeuvre.
But clearly, the unilateralist discourse-in which the US expressed fears that the burden of consensus building might constrain it from acting freely in the pursuit of its stated ideals of promoting democracy, human rights and free trade-has been in the ascendancy in the 21 st century and has found its fullest articulation in contemporary US policy in Iraq (see Dodge 2003) . But the removal of Saddam Hussein has been but one episode, theoretically at least, in a wider agenda for a world the US 'seeks to create' and the manner in which it proposes to undertake this task (Rhodes, 2003: 132) .
Unilateral action, backed by American military power, is the modus operandi to be adopted. We do not yet know the degree to which US staying power will back up this rhetoric. But failing to live up to expectations will only reinforce that already strong stream of cynicism that greets American motives in many parts of world opinion (see Prestowitz, 2003:1-14) . In short, while the rhetoric of the early 21 st century has been idealist, we have yet to see whether the practice will confirm this principle, or whether the realist instinct to privilege the US interest in the international system without actually changing the system will re-occur as it has done in times in past.
Thus, stripped of its essentials, the purpose of current American strategy seems to be the use of its military, technical, and what it believes to be its moral, superiority to advance a very specific view of liberalism and freedom. The simple and universal view of freedom espoused by the neo-conservative idealists currently driving US foreign policy is rarely reflected in political practice. Moreover, the ideas of liberalism and freedom found in large pockets of the American right is alien to that which exists in many of the world's other developed democracies, and indeed also within significant streams of political thinking within the United States (see Foner, 1998 and Richardson, 2001 ). and moderate and pluralist understanding of the concept (Richardson, 2002: 8-9) . The
Bush view appears to represent a strange mix of Isaiah Berlin's (1969) negative and positive views of liberty, with an emphasis on the right to the negative freedom to choose on the one hand, and accompanied by a positive requirement, for others at least, to accept certain prescribed moral truths on the other. This is, at the very least, a self-contradictory theoretical position.
Generalisations should not be made about US foreign policy purely on the basis a reading of the Bush era alone, especially regarding attitudes towards multilateral institutions. As we have suggested, historical patterns present a more complex picture. The relationship between US foreign policy and multilateralism has always been, ambivalent and instrumental (Stewart, 2002: 12-13 and Luck, 2003) . Thus, any longer term prospects for a more cooperative and multilateral international order are Europeans (and, we might note, especially the UK before Tony Blair became entangled in the Bush project) it is 'globalisation' (Daalder, 2003: 151-53 Deiter and Higgott, 2003; Stubbs, 2002) .
In short, US Allies, especially the Europeans and, to a lesser extent the Asians, seem intent on creating an institutional order less dependent on American power, more dependent on rules and principles and in which the US is granted less prerogative and licence than in the past. Their rhetoric is certainly different to that which emanates from the USA. But so to is their practice as illustrated, for example, in the contrast between the increasingly systematic use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism by the EU and Asia on the one hand, and the across the board resistance (UN, ICC, Kyoto, Land mines etc) by the US to containment within multilateral institutions on the other.
These differences having been noted, it behoves us to remember that the current historical rupture in thinking between Washington and other points of the global compass is so sharp that much of what was learned in the post-Cold War decade is in danger of being forgotten. Prior to the rise to power of the neo-conservatives, it was possible to identify a (see Risse, 2002) high degree of trust and loyalty amongst the ruling trans-Atlantic policy communities. Such was the degree of this trust that even serious conflicts (over trade, for example) did not threaten the ability of the wider structure of institutions and shared expectations to contain them. It is because the ideological position and behaviour of the neo-conservatives is so far to the unilateral end of the curve that trust in the US to use of its power responsibly in what Risse calls a 'liberal security community' appears to be waning.
Conclusion: Hegemony and Institutionalism in an Era of Ambiguity
We live an era of ambiguity. A number of important similarities and differences For all it's military might, the US remains reliant on other countries-especially in East Asia-to continue funding its debt and consumption patterns (Goodman 2003) .
It is here that our moral hazard argument returns. To-date, the US has been able to spend on overseas ventures reliant in the knowledge that others will share, indeed carry, most of the costs. The assumption, if never explicitly stated, has been that others would be unwilling to cease funding the debt because of the implications it has for the continued health of their own economies. But things are changing. In contrast to the first Gulf War-which thanks to the support of wealthy allies (notably Japan If we follow Martin's logic, then even with a change of Administration, in Washington, the trust deficit that has been created is likely to remain for some time to come. The reputation of multilateralism as a principal (and principled) institutional form of global governance in both the economic and, it goes without saying, the security domain in the early years of the 21 st century, is badly damaged. It will take time to tell whether this damage can be undone. More generally, some scholars are beginning to ask, as indeed do we by implication in this paper, if the US may have been undermining the very basis of its own hegemonic position in the early 21 st century. According to John Ikenberry (2004: 20) , for example, the 'neofundamentalist' security policies of Bush Administration have 'squandered America's moral authority' and led to dramatically wrong strategic thinking that has underminded US credibility, prestige, security relationships and goodwill; and done so to such an extent that it will take many years to undo.
A change of heart in the US is not all that is required to undo this situation. This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to (re) build positive structures of global economic governance and it is not axiomatic. Any administration will be subject to pressures to respond to increasingly assertive domestic interests that-like US allies in the international domain-have been freed from the disciplines of the Cold War.
Growing numbers of politically powerful domestic actors, resorting to increasingly nationalist rhetoric about what they see as the negative impact of globalisation on jobs and welfare, increasingly rail against the US accepting binding multilateral commitments or indeed undertaking other foreign policy initiatives in general.
A hegemon, any hegemon, inevitably attracts enmity and resistance. But an altruistic (Kindledberger, 1973) or a benign (Strange, 1987) US hegemony, capable of delivering global public goods, has clearly had, until recently, a longstanding degree of acceptance and implicit (if not overt) legitimacy, in large quarters of world opinion.
The same cannot be said in the contemporary in which the US-in what many sees as an assertively nationalist projection of a narrowly conceived interest (Bhagwati and Panagariya's 'selfish hegemon', 2003:13)-demonstrates little or no concern for problems other than those which affect it directly and in which the issue of the legitimacy of the hegemon's behaviour ceases to be one of implicit acceptance and becomes on of explicit scrutiny. 9 Notwithstanding the continuities and changes we have identified in US foreign policy over the period under review in this essay, this difference-between a relatively benign, albeit instrumental, hegemony underwritten by liberal principles and institutions on the one hand and a more selfish hegemony, underscored by a stronger Jacksonian nationalism, on the other-is the key difference between the two eras.
